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INTRODUCTION: 
EAST TIMORESE POLITICS IN 
TRANSITION 
Michael Leach and Damien Kingsbury 
This edited collection examines key issues in the contemporary politics of Timor-
Leste. In particular, it focuses on democratic consolidation and the ongoing 
development of political institutions during an especially critical period for the 
young nation: the transition from more than a decade of international state-building 
assistance. It assesses challenges that have burdened the young state since formal 
independence in 2002 and considers its future prospects. Issues of particular focus 
include constitutional debates, political party formation, the operation of the 
government decentralization, foreign policy, development, gender discrimination, 
combating corruption, security sector reform, the politics of justice, relations with 
traditional authorities, and the challenges of nation-building. In examining these 
themes, the contributors highlight the fledgling state's successes and failures as well 
as matters that remain unresolved as international state-building forces prepare to 
depart. While each theme addressed in the collection focuses on Timor-Leste' s 
specific experience, these issues also pertain to many post-colonial and developing 
countries, particularly those of the southwest Pacific and sub-Saharan Africa. As the 
object of five consecutive UN missions with varying mandates, Timor-Leste is a 
critical case study of international state-building projects. In these respects, the 
Timor-Leste experience offers a model for comparative consideration across a much 
wider field. 
COLONIALISM, INDEPENDENCE, AND INTERNATIONAL STATE-BUILDING 
Timor-Leste was a late arrival on the post-colonial scene, gammg its 
independence at the tail end of the post-World War II decolonization process. First 
colonized by Portuguese Dominican priests, along with Portuguese traders and their 
descendants from nearby islands in the sixteenth century, Portuguese Timar 
remained a colonial backwater until its invasion and occupation by Japan in 1942. 
Following Japan's defeat, Portuguese Timar slipped back into colonial obscurity, 
notable mostly for the presence of occasional political prisoners who were banished 
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to the then-Portuguese Timor by Portugal's Salazar regime. Following the 
"Carnation Revolution" in Portugal in 1974, and the related and rushed process of 
decolonization, Timor-Leste began to develop its first local political parties. In 1975, 
neighboring Indonesia began to foment discord between Timor-Leste's nascent 
political parties, leading in August 1975 to a brief but bloody war between the two 
largest parties, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor-Leste (Frente 
Revolucionaria de Timor-Leste Independente, FRETILIN) and the Timorese 
Democratic Union (Uniao Democratica Timorense, UDT). Indonesia soon after 
engaged in cross-border raids. In December 1975, just days after Timor-Leste 
declared independence, its giant neighbor launched a full-scale invasion of 
Portuguese Timar, followed by progressive occupation and forced integration of the 
province in 1976. The restoration of Timor-Leste's independence was to be put off for 
another quarter of a century. 
Resistance to Indonesia's invasion and twenty-four-year occupation led to the 
deaths of as many as 180,000 people, 1 the establishment of a disciplined 
underground resistance, and an extensive international support network. Timor-
Leste was never recognized under international law as part of Indonesia and 
remained a major diplomatic, military, and financial problem for the occupying state. 
When Indonesia came under increasing external pressure following the financial 
crisis of 1997-98, its then recently appointed president, B. J. Habibie, announced that 
Timor-Leste could vote on whether it wished to remain a part of Indonesia. On 
August 30, 1999, the East Timorese people voted overwhelmingly for independence 
in a referendum conducted by the United Nations Mission in East Timar 
(UNAMET). Violence and destruction, which had accompanied the lead up to the 
referendum, broke in a storm after the announcement of the ballot results, leaving 
more than three-quarters of the population of Timor-Leste displaced and more than 
70 percent of its buildings and infrastructure destroyed. Australian-led INTERFET 
(International Force for East Timor) military forces, under the auspices of the United 
Nations, intervened, Indonesian forces departed, and the process of rebuilding the 
shattered territory and people as an independent state was begun under the United 
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). 
As the site of one of the United Nations' first experiments in direct governance of 
a territory, and of ongoing international state-building assistance, Timor-Leste 
remains a unique case study of a double transition to independence and democracy 
through a period of direct international governance. Under its Security Council 
mandate, UNTAET exercised full legislative and executive authority from 1999-2002, 
running both the security forces and an international peacekeeping mission in 
Timor-Leste while seeking to build new governmental institutions for the emerging 
state and overseeing the formation of a constitutional assembly in 2001. The scope of 
the UNTAET mission was unprecedented in the region. While the United Nations 
had briefly administered West New Guinea from September 1962 until May 1, 1963, 
this "seat-warming" interregnum did not develop and execute policy decisions as it 
did in Timor-Leste between 1999 and 2002. The United Nations' role in Cambodia in 
1 See CAVR (Comissao de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliac;;ao), Chega!: The Report of the 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste (Dili: CAVR, 2005). CA VR's 
estimate of the minimum total number of conflict-related deaths is 102,800. This figure 
includes both killings and deaths due to privation. The often-cited figure of 180,000 is CAVR's 
upper estimate of total conflict-related mortality. 
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1991-92, while substantial, is best described as co-administration,2 as the UN 
operated alongside a sovereign government, wielding decision-making powers in 
certain areas and primarily focused on peacekeeping.3 The year 1999 was to prove an 
important year in the practice of UN-led international state-building, as the Security 
Council endorsed three separate missions mandating the direct international 
administration of a territory.4 Of these missions, the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), in conjunction with the European 
Union, most closely paralleled the United Nation's state-building experience in 
Timor-Leste. But perhaps even more so than in Kosovo, the United Nations' role in 
Timor-Leste was notable because it had to construct the institutions of a new state 
from what was, in effect, a tabula rasa. 
Timor-Leste therefore stands as a critical exemplar of contemporary international 
state-building. Distinct from other forms of development assistance in the level of 
intervention in national sovereignty,5 state-building is concerned with "constructing 
or reconstructing institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with 
physical and economic security."' 6 As Mark T. Berger notes, the policy rationale for 
contemporary international state-building missions reflects the perceived connection 
between international security and development, with a clear emphasis on the 
pathologies "failed states" present for regional or world orders. State-building 
missions are seen as an effort to maintain a stable world, or regional order, in the face 
of a range of assessed risks, from humanitarian concerns to systemic concerns over 
the spread of international crime syndicates or terrorist networks. Reflecting the 
diversity of these concerns, state-building can encompass "formal military 
occupation, counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, national reconstruction, foreign aid, 
and the use of stabilization forces under the auspices of the USA, Britain, France, 
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], the UN, or another international or 
regional organization." 7 
Timor-Leste has also experienced two major periods of state-building assistance 
since independence. The United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor 
(UNMISET), in operation from May 2002 to May 2005, was mandated by the Security 
Council to provide peacekeeping forces and state-building assistance in the 
devolution of security functions to East Timorese authorities. This operation wound 
down in May 2005, with policing handed to East Timorese authorities and a smaller 
political mission, the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), in place until 
August 2006. By early 2006, Timor-Leste was widely seen as a UN success story.8 
2 Erika de Wet, "The Direct Administration of Territories by the United Nations and Its 
Member States in the Post Cold-War Era: Legal Bases and Implications for National Law," Max 
Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 8,1 (2004): 297. 
3 Ibid. The 1993 United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the UN High 
Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 are likewise best characterized as co-
administrations. 
4 United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), established in 
1999, was limited to two years before sovereign functions were handed over to Croatia. 
5 Julien Barbara, "Rethinking Neo-Liberal State Building: Building Post-Conflict Development 
States," Development in Practice 18,3 (2008): 308. 
6 David Chandler, Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building (London: Pluto Press, 2006), p. 1. 
7 Mark T. Berger, "From Nation-Building to State-Building: The Geopolitics of Development, 
the Nation-State System and the Changing Global Order," Third World Quarterly 27,l (2006): 6. 
8 Ibid., p. 20. 
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Despite what appeared to be a sound beginning after independence in 2002, the 
political-military crisis of April-May 2006 shook erstwhile confidence in the success 
of the UN' s first comprehensive state-building mission, highlighting unresolved 
social divisions left from the occupation era, which were compounded by 
competition for scarce resources and the weight of unmet popular expectations. 
Timor-Leste entered its second major period of international state-building 
assistance following independence with its key security institutions in disarray. 
Having downscaled the UNMISET mission in 2005, with the strong support of 
Australia, the United Nations returned after the crisis in 2006 with a new 
peacekeeping mission: the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste 
(UNMIT). Authorized by the Security Council to reestablish a UN police force until 
the PNTL (Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste, the National Police of Timor-Leste) 
could be retrained and reformed, UNMIT has also played a major role in institutional 
capacity building in the formal justice sector and in electoral administration. 
Alongside UNMIT in 2006 was a new Australian-led military force, the International 
Stabilisation Force (ISF). This represented a newer strand of thinking in regional 
state-building, as Australia and New Zealand chose not to "blue helmet" their 
military forces as they had in the previous UNTAET and UNMISET eras. Operating 
outside the structure of the UN mission under a bilateral agreement with the 
government of Timor-Leste, the ISF subsequently concluded a mutual cooperation 
agreement with UNMIT, though without an overarching coordinating body between 
the two missions. This decision was formally justified as providing "greater 
operational and logistical flexibility; proven command and control arrangements; 
and alleviation of UN budgetary pressure," 9 and allowing the UN to focus its 
contribution on state-building rather than security.10 However, the decision was also 
determined, in part, by Australian government dissatisfaction with UN command 
structures in the earlier missions. According to an Australian Senate report, the ISF 
mission and the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) 
instance a growing commitment to direct roles in regional peacekeeping where 
Australian "security interests" were seen to be at stake.11 
Timor-Leste's importance in comparative studies extends to its significance in 
illustrating the distinct challenges of nation-building: the processes of forming a 
cohesive "national" political community based on a unifying sense of national 
identity. The history of post-colonial state-building has often been one of attempts to 
build functional state institutions while overlooking the critical issues of national 
cohesion essential to political stability. In Timor-Leste, as in many other post-colonial 
societies, many of the forms of national unity developed during the Indonesian 
occupation fractured in the wake of independence. Especially in contexts of weak 
economic development, latent ethnic, regional, or social divisions may be 
9 Australian Embassy and Permanent Mission to the United Nations (press release), "East 
Timor: Recent Unrest and UN Security Council Agreement on International Security Force," 
November 3, 2006. 
10 Australian Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade, Australia's 
Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations, Commonwealth of Australia (2008), p. 52, http:/ /www. 
aph.gov.au/binaries I senate I committee I fadt_ctte I peacekeeping/ report/ report.pdf, accessed 
August 7, 2012. 
11 Ibid., p. 44. Former prime minister John Howard justified the ISF commitment as "the 
problems of weak and fragile states, especially ones on our doorstep, can very quickly become 
our problems." 
East Timorese Politics in Transition 
compounded by-and sometimes recruited in-competition for scarce resources, 
producing forms of national politics characterized by intergroup contests for control 
of the state, to benefit regional or clan-based patronage networks. Timor-Leste also 
serves as an exemplar of the particular nation-building challenges in subsistence 
societies, where the integration of rural communities into "modern" economic and 
political systems regulated by the state may be minimal. Such environments are 
normally characterized by the ongoing presence of "local administrative mechanisms 
capable of operating independently from the state in accordance with the principles 
of 'traditional authority,"' 12 and some degree of popular perception that the modern-
state model has been "imposed" on the citizenry. Reflecting these issues, Timor-Leste 
has also become a site in which debates over new "hybrid" institutions are played 
out publicly. Despite the avowedly forward-looking attitudes of its current leaders, 
Timor-Leste remains strongly tied to its past, both through the persistence of custom 
and the memory of conflict. In the evolving process of liberal democratization, there 
have been calls for and against greater incorporation of traditional authority and 
dispute resolution, 13 especially at the local government level. 
Internationally, as a small and relatively dependent state, Timor-Leste has also 
been the focus of discussion over the growing role of China's "soft power" and 
global resource diplomacy, and over how Timor-Leste balances its two major 
neighbors, Australia and Indonesia, as well as its involvement with the global 
Lusophone community. Most notably, perhaps, Timor-Leste is a site in which the 
difficult issues of post-conflict justice and reconciliation remain a source of social 
discord, set against a recent history of systematic and widespread human-rights 
abuses. These are each critical issues that continue to inform and inflame the politics 
of Timor-Leste, as in many other post-conflict societies around the world. 
EAST TIMORESE POLITICS SINCE 2007 
While Timor-Leste has, to date, avoided the mantle of a "failed state," 
unresolved divisions within East Timorese society, together with bitter intra-elite 
political maneuvering contributed to the complete breakdown of security forces in 
2006, with open conflict between army factions and between the army and police. 
This institutional breakdown was followed by widespread youth gang violence and 
arson in Dili, primarily (though not exclusively) directed against people from the 
eastern districts living in Dili, and the resignation of Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, 
who had led the FRETILIN government since independence in 2002. Though 
ultimately short-lived, the politicization of regional identity saw Loromonu (western) 
and Lorosa'e (eastern) gangs in open conflict in the streets of Dili and led to the crisis 
being widely referred to in media coverage as the "east-west" crisis. 14 However, 
12 Rod Nixon, "The Crisis of Governance in New Subsistence States," Journal of Contemporary 
Asia 36,l (2006): 75. 
13 Jose Trindade and Bryant Castro, Rethinking Timorese Identity as a Peacebuilding Strategy: The 
Lorosa'e-Loromonu Conflict from a Traditional Perspective (Dili: European Union's Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism Programme, 2007). 
14 While the terms "Loromonu" and "Lorosa'e" (literally, "sunset" and "sunrise" in Tetum) 
gained currency in the 2006 crisis, there is a deeper popular tradition dating to colonial times 
of collectively referring to East Timorese from the western districts as Kaladi, and easterners as 
Firaku. See Dionisio Baba-Soares, "Branching from the Trunk: East Timorese Perceptions of 
Nationalism in Transition" (doctoral dissertation, Australian National University, 2003). 
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those studying the conflict's ongms in unresolved legacies of the Indonesian 
occupation, in the politicization of the security sector, and in unmet popular 
expectations for both economic progress and justice came to accept the term 
"political-military" crisis as the most appropriate. 15 In conjunction with international 
state-builders, the East Timorese state since 2006 has attempted to address the social, 
economic, and institutional deficits that have consigned many post-colonial states to 
a cycle of internal repression and resistance. 
A key initial mandate of the UNMIT mission was to oversee the 2007 
presidential and parliamentary elections, which took place in the still-tense wake of 
the crisis, with more than 160,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in and around 
Dili, an international presence of 1,600 UN police, and an ISF military presence of 
1,000 troops. The first round of the presidential election was held on April 9, 2007. 
FRETILIN's Francisco "Lu Olo" Guterres (27.89 percent) and Jose Ramos-Horta 
(21.81 percent) emerged as the leading candidates, with a second-round runoff 
election held on May 9. The weight of the eliminated-candidates' support fell behind 
Jose Ramos-Horta (69.18 percent), who was inaugurated as the second president of 
Timor-Leste on May 20, 2007. Fourteen political parties, including two formal 
coalitions, then contested the June 30 parliamentary elections. The entry of several 
new parties was significant, especially that of National Congress of the Timorese 
Reconstruction (CNRT), led by former President Xanana Gusmao. Echoing the 
historically significant acronym of the National Council of Timorese Resistance, 
formed by Gusmao in 1998 to unite all East Timorese pro-independence factions (the 
council had previously been titled the National Council of Maubere Resistance, 
formed in 1988), the original CNRT led the independence campaign in the 1999 
referendum, then dissolved to allow for a multiparty system. The new party 
acronym CNRT thus resurrected a well-known symbol from the latter period of the 
independence struggle. With his long-term political ally Ramos-Horta winning the 
presidency, Gusmao sought to challenge FRETILIN's domination of post-
independence politics and secure the more powerful post of prime minister. The 
dissident Mudan9a (Change) group within FRETILIN supported the CNRT 
campaign. 
In line with the presidential poll, FRETILIN' s vote fell significantly to 29 percent, 
representing just over half its 2001 performance. In second place, CNRT secured 24 
percent of the national vote, polling especially strongly vote in Dili. The rise of CNRT 
clearly affected the more established opposition parties, preventing major gains on 
their 2001 performance. Seven parties or coalitions exceeded the 3 percent threshold 
to be eligible for seats in the new, smaller parliament (reduced to 65 from 88 seats in 
2001). While the former governing party, FRETILIN, emerged as the single largest 
party with 21 seats, no single party secured a governing majority of 33 seats in its 
own right. Gusmao' s CNRT won 18 seats and quickly commenced alliance 
negotiations with the Democratic Party (PD, Partido Democratico; 8 seats) and the 
social democratic coalition (ASDT-PSD; 11 seats).16 
15 For a detailed examination of developments in East Timorese politics from 2002 until late 
2006, including the political-military crisis, see Damien Kingsbury and Michael Leach, 
"Introduction," in East Timar: Beyond Independence, ed. Damien Kingsbury and Michael Leach 
(Clayton: Monash Asia Institute Press, 2007), pp. 1-16. 
16 The Timorese Association of Social Democrats (ASDT, Associa<_;ao Social-Democrata de 
Timor) and the Social Democrat Party of Timor-Leste (PSD, Partido Social Democrata). 
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One notable trend from the presidential elections was the emergence of three 
geographic voting blocs. The eastern districts of Baucau, Lautem, and Viqueque 
returned majorities for FRETILIN's presidential candidate, Lu Olo, while the districts 
around the capital (Dili, Manatuto, and Liquica) were Ramos-Horta's stronghold, 
and the western districts recorded their strongest votes for other opposition party 
leaders, such as Fernando "Lasama" de Araujo of PD, or Xavier do Amaral of ASDT. 
With minor exceptions, 17 the pattern was repeated in the parliamentary election in 
regionalized voting for FRETILIN, CNRT, and ASDT-PSD or PD. These outcomes 
demonstrated that while political divisions in Timor-Leste were more complex than 
the claimed "east-west divide" of 2006, there was a substantial risk that FRETILIN 
would be seen to primarily represent the three eastern districts, while the parties in 
negotiation for an alliance would effectively be seen to represent the rest of the 
country. 18 
With no clear mandate for any one party, and with highly regionalized party 
affiliations suggesting wider problems of national unity, President Jose Ramos-Horta 
had initially raised the prospect of a government of "grand inclusion" comprising all 
major parties. Despite initial support from PD leader Fernando "Lasama" de Araujo, 
FRETILIN and CNRT ruled out working together, the former stating its members 
would prefer to act as a strong opposition if they could not form a government. On 
July 6, notwithstanding some well-publicized criticisms of CNRT by PSD leader 
Mario Carrascalao, a post-election coalition between CNRT, ASDT-PSD, and PD was 
formally confirmed, with the announcement of the AMP (Parliamentary Majority 
Alliance) controlling 37 seats.19 
FRETILIN argued that, as the largest party, it should be presented the first 
opportunity to form a government by testing its program on the floor of the 
parliament. As the new parliament was sworn in, the election of PD leader Lasama 
as president (speaker) of parliament over the FRETILIN candidate, by 42 votes to 21, 
strongly suggested that a FRETILIN minority government presenting its program to 
the legislature would face insuperable difficulties. This result, and the clear AMP 
coalition majority it demonstrated, determined Ramos-Horta's subsequent decision. 
On August 6, President Ramos-Horta invited Xanana Gusmao to form a government. 
Gusmao was sworn-in as prime minister on August 8, with Mudanr;a leader Jose Luis 
Guterres as deputy. PSD' s veteran leader and former governor during the 
Indonesian interregnum, Mario Carrascalao, was later sworn in as a second deputy 
prime minister. FRETILIN claimed the president's decision was unconstitutional but 
dropped the threat of a legal challenge in favor of working toward a "political 
solution." FRETILIN members returned to parliament in late August and soon 
commenced work as a parliamentary opposition. 
17 The exceptions were the western district of Cova Lima, which returned a slightly stronger 
FRETILIN vote and small CNRT leads in the western districts of Bobonaro and Oecussi. See 
Michael Leach, "The 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Timor-Leste," Australian 
Journal of Politics and History 55,2 (2009): 219-32. 
18 International Crisis Group, "Timor-Leste's Parliamentary Elections," Asia Briefing 65 (June 
12, 2007), p. 4. 
19 The smaller party, UNDERTIM, later joined the AMP coalition, giving the alliance thirty-
nine seats. 
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The AMP in Government 
The AMP government came to office in August 2007 promising to boost broad-
based development in the areas of food sufficiency, health care, education, and 
infrastructure. On taking office, the AMP parties had anti-FRETILIN sentiment in 
common, shared the Catholic Church's endorsement, and had broadly concurred on 
the need to encourage greater levels of foreign investment. As an executive, the AMP 
government also comprised a wide range of actors with starkly different histories 
and agendas, combining national heroes of the resistance era with a host of younger 
upcoming leaders and, more controversially, some erstwhile supporters of 
"autonomy" within Indonesia occupying ministerial positions. The AMP coalition 
nonetheless itself proved durable, despite major eruptions of disunity. 
The development policies pursued by the AMP were broadly similar to those 
that had been pursued by the previous FRETILIN government, both being focused 
on the allocation of state resources to alleviate illiteracy, malnutrition, and simple 
illnesses. Aside from the far larger budgets available to the AMP administration-
itself an enduring legacy of difficult oil revenue negotiations with Australia 
conducted by the former FRETILIN government-the principle policy differences 
were the AMP government's slightly more pro-business, pro-foreign-investment 
orientation, its desire to spend more of Timor-Leste's growing petroleum revenues 
for development needs, and its inclination to countenance the idea of borrowing. In 
2007, the overriding political demands facing the incoming government remained 
those of improving the basic government services, infrastructure, and employment 
opportunities destroyed by departing Indonesian troops and their militia proxies in 
1999. Both the interim UN administration and the first post-independence 
government were perceived as having underperformed on these fronts, though both 
were operating within severe infrastructure and human-resource constraints, and the 
latter, at least, remained highly constrained by limited annual budgets. 
The AMP government's performance in implementing its program was mixed, 
and continually hampered by low levels of government capacity, which slowed the 
rollout of major infrastructure programs, including programs to increase the supply 
of potable water, provide badly needed road maintenance, and begin electrification 
of the country. Thanks to high global demand for oil, which boosted prices and 
hence government revenue, and the fact that government spending was driving 
almost all other economic activity, Timor-Leste rode out the Global Financial Crisis 
of 2009-12 unaffected. Timor-Leste's economic situation had begun to improve, with 
an economic growth rate of around 10 percent a year for the three years to the end of 
2011, though from a low GDP base and almost entirely driven by government 
spending. However, the government was consistently unable fully to disburse its 
available funds. This lack of "absorptive capacity," particularly beyond Dili, meant 
that government spending, as the main driver of economic growth, continued to run 
at lower than optimal levels. Even in the capital, economic growth was unable to 
spark employment growth, and drove considerable inflation in the prices of both 
essential and consumer goods20• Electrification proceeded with two heavy oil 
generators to be replaced by gas-powered generators around 2015, though the 
contract process proved highly controversial, with extended delays in contract 
20 See Ministry of Finance, "Consumer Price Index-Dili Region," Issue 21, October 2011. The_ 
CPI for the Dili region was estimated at 14.4 percent from October 2010 to October 2011. 
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establishment and major contract renegotiations. Notably, beyond Dili, there were 
often very few signs of any government spending, with most of the country 
remaining in a state of poverty and often decrepitude. 
Several headline development indicators were promising, including a decline in 
the overall poverty rate from 50 percent to 41 percent of the population from 2007 to 
2011. The widespread provision of subsidized rice, cash transfers, and the spread of 
health clinics supported by Cuban doctors and their medical training programs led 
to improvement in key health indicators. Infant mortality rates fell by half between 
2004 and 2011, maternal mortality rates more than halved, and average life 
expectancy increased from 58 years to more than 62 years. The country's fertility 
rates, for several years the highest in the world at just below eight live births per 
woman, moderated to just under six. Some of these gains reflected improved access 
to health care, greater food security and better crops due to the end of a debilitating 
drought, and the powerful Catholic Church quietly acknowledging that the country 
could not sustain the growth rate it had been experiencing. Literacy, however, 
remained problematic, at about 50 percent. In part, this low literacy rate reflected a 
disconnect between official and actual teaching practices and the clash of languages 
at different levels of education-Tetum or another local language at early primary 
school, Portuguese at higher levels of primary school and high school, and the 
continuing, though no longer exclusive, importance of Indonesian at university. One 
bright spot was that the literacy rate in the youth demographic was at 77 percent, 
considerably better than that of the overall population. 
Particularly in rural areas, however, many East Timorese saw only modest 
improvement in their lives. The UN special rapporteur on extreme poverty estimated 
that a majority of the 75 percent of East Timorese living in rural areas were 
"entrenched in inter-generational cycles of poverty,"21 and that some 58 percent of 
East Timorese children suffered from chronic malnutrition, with almost half of all 
children under five underweight for their age (a problem that had historically 
afflicted Timorese children). The same report claimed that income inequality had 
"risen significantly," with particularly stark gaps between Dili-where 71 percent of 
the highest income quintile resided-and rural areas. Despite large and growing 
annual budgets, just over 10 percent of the funds was dedicated to social spending in 
the key areas of education, health, and agriculture (areas heavily supported by 
international aid programs), with the majority of the budget focused on 
infrastructure funding. 
A petroleum fund worth some US$11 billion by the middle of 2012 made Timor-
Leste the envy of other smaller emerging states in the region. However, the reliance 
of annual budgets on petroleum revenues (more than 93 percent of government 
revenue in the 2012 budget) demonstrated the longer-term potential for Timor-Leste 
to suffer the "resource curse" pathologies of other oil-dependent, developing states. 
In particular, Timor-Leste's high-cost and low-skills-based economy precluded 
development of alternative export sectors. In August 2010, the AMP government 
outlined a National Strategic Development Plan for 2011-30 that, once again, 
highlighted the goals of economic diversification for the future. Other controversies 
have attended the petroleum fund, including the decision of the AMP to withdraw 
21 UN News Centre, "Not All Timorese Benefiting from Economic Gains, UN Human Rights 
Expert Says," November 18, 2011, http://www.un.org/ apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40437 
&Cr=timor&Crl=, accessed August 7, 2012. 
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annual amounts above the Estimated Sustainable Income threshold, broadly 
calculated at around 3 percent, to prompt more rapid development, and the decision 
to relax some of the investment rules governing the fund that mandate lower risk 
investments. 
If the broad economic and development indicators highlighted the deep 
challenges facing the post-independence state, the AMP government's performance 
on entrenched social conflicts demonstrated its capacity to solve problems. The oil-
price spike of 2008 gave the government windfall gains, which it was able to use in 
the form of cash grants to buy off disenfranchised groups, including disaffected 
former soldiers, internally displaced persons, and veterans, as well as providing 
small pensions for the relatively small number of people over sixty-five. The 
provision of heavily subsidized rice also helped avert the perennial problems of 
seasonal starvation, making life easier for many Timorese. The tension that had 
pervaded Dili into 2008 disappeared with the closure of the IDP camps and the 
payment to family heads of US$5,000 to rebuild their homes. Less successful, 
perhaps, was the government's attempt to deal with entrenched and complex land 
disputes, which had led to occupations of contested land and forced evictions.22 
Following the violence that began in 2006, continued beyond the elections, and 
finally ebbed in 2008, Timor-Leste has since experienced relative stability and calm, 
and the streets of the main towns, particularly Dili, have an air of normalcy, with 
people promenading and cooking along the foreshore in the evenings and markets 
filled with produce. While the various programs aimed at displaced and disaffected 
groups brought about a sense of peace and security, criticisms that the government 
had "bought" peace, in ways which may prove unsustainable, will be tested after 
international forces withdraw. 
Despite the AMP government's relatively good performance in some areas, it has 
also attracted considerable criticism, in particular for alleged corruption, with 
persistent, though in many cases unproven, charges of large government contracts 
being awarded to AMP party officials and relatives of key ministers without full 
transparency with regard to tender processes.23 In response, the government 
established an anti-corruption commission and launched a visible anti-corruption 
campaign, including signing up to the global Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative. Despite these moves, the increasing range of budget funds not subject to 
detailed parliamentary oversight presented a further source of concern over 
transparency, with key East Timorese civil society groups arguing that the limited 
information provided on special development funds in the 2011 state budget law 
created a "dangerous precedent" that stood to "erode parliamentary authority" over 
time.24 In September 2010, in a dramatic development, Deputy Prime Minister 
22 International Crisis Group, "Managing Land Conflict in Timor-Leste," Asia Briefing 110 
(September 9, 2010), pp. 1-19. 
23 Mark Dodd, "Gusmao's $15m Rice Deal Alarms UN," The Australian, July 7, 2008, 
http: I I www.theaustralian.com.au/ news I gusmaos-15m-rice-deal-alarms-un/ story-e6frg6t6-1 
111116839519, accessed August 7, 2012. In 2012, the former Justice Minister Lucia Lobato was 
found guilty of unlawful economic participation in a tender process and sentenced to five 
years jail. 
24 
"La'o Hamutuk Submission to National Parliament Committee C (Economy, Finances and 
Anti-corruption) regarding the General State Budget for 2011," December 15, 2010, updated 
January 10, 2011, http:/ /www.laohamutuk.org/econ/OGEll/LHsubComCOGEllDeclOEn .. 
htm, accessed August 14, 2012. 
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Carrascalao resigned after a clash with Prime Minister Gusmao, citing issues of 
transparency and accountability and claiming that personal attacks had been made 
against him as a result of his anti-corruption work. 
Of all the dramatic developments that have wracked East Timorese politics, the 
greatest unfolded early on the morning of February 11, 2008, when President Ramos-
Horta was shot and gravely wounded by a member of Alfredo Reinado' s rebel group 
during an armed invasion by the group of the president's residence. Demanding to 
see the president, Reinado and one of his men were shot and killed by F-FDTL 
(Falintil-Fon;as de Defesa de Timor Leste) presidential guards. Returning from his 
morning walk shortly thereafter, Ramos-Horta was shot and critically wounded by 
one of Reinado' s group. This incident was immediately followed by an ambush on 
Prime Minister Gusmao' s residence at Balibar in the hills above Dili. The surviving 
members of the group involved in these incidents, including the petitioners' leader 
Lieutenant Cashio Salsinha, who later claimed the episode was part of a "negotiation 
strategy" that had gone wrong, were sentenced in March 2010 to lengthy jail terms, 
then pardoned by presidential decree in August 2010.25 
The release of the Salsinha group, which followed the release of Martenus Bere, a 
former pro-Indonesian militia leader indicted by the UN's Timor-Leste-based Serious 
Crimes Unit over the Suai massacre in 1999, and the pardon of Joni Marques, one of 
the few militia members to be convicted and jailed after the violence, reinforced 
increasing concern over what has been widely described as a "culture of impunity" 
in Timor-Leste. The Bere case, in particular, raised concerns over the operation of the 
separation of powers, as Bere, after being arrested, was released by executive order 
without judicial oversight of the process. This, in turn, had implications for the 
popular understanding of and faith in the legal process. 
Despite representing a key area of UNMITs mandate, security-sector reform 
remained an area of critical concern. After extensive rebuilding and retraining, the 
PNTL progressively reassumed responsibility for policing from their UN 
counterparts, albeit with mixed reception by the public. Many of the complaints that 
had dogged the PNTL up until 2006, including corruption and brutality, resurfaced 
as the PNTL took control of policing operations.26 Though the full handover was 
completed in early 2011, the security-sector reform agenda, so long a focus of 
international state-building assistance, was widely considered to have failed in 
several of its core goals, at least partly as a result of limited cooperation from the East 
Timorese government.27 While recommending the reduction of UN policing forces 
and noting major improvements in the security situation since 2008, the International 
Crisis Group acknowledged that latent security threats remained, most the product 
of failures to prosecute those involved in the violence of 2006 and 2008, including the 
failure to pursue United Nations Commission of Inquiry-recommended 
prosecutions for the events of 2006. 
25 In early 2011, Salsinha launched· a claim on behalf of the members of his group who missed 
out on petitioner compensation payments as a result of their participation in these events. 
26 Matt Crook, "Ramos-Horta Says East Timar Finds Peace," Sydney Morning Herald, May 20, 
2010, http: I I news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-world I ramoshorta-says-east-timor-finds-peace-
20100520-vman.html, accessed August 7, 2012. 
27 International Crisis Group, "Timor-Leste: Time for the UN to Step Back," Asia Briefing 116 
(December 15, 2010), pp. 1-14. 
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One of the areas of PNTL responsibility-the border-had become again a site of 
dispute between Timor-Leste and Indonesia, particularly in the enclave of Oecusse 
where there had been Indonesian military incursions into some border villages (in 
one case when Prime Minister Gusmao was about to visit the area). Other incidents 
included Indonesian naval patrols in Timor-Leste waters, allegedly to forestall 
"piracy." These incidents, in turn, put a halt to the finalization of the border between 
Timor-Leste and Indonesia. In addition, regional tension flared over Australian 
proposals to create a regional asylum-seeker processing center in Timor-Leste. The 
proposal was rebuffed quickly by the East Timorese parliament, though the 
executive government was less direct in its opposition, referring the matter to the 
regional "Bali process" forum, where the proposal was subsequently rejected. 
Tensions between the AMP government and major hydrocarbon development 
partner Woodside Petroleum over the location of a natural gas processing plant also 
continued to cause friction in the bilateral relationship, as the East Timorese 
leadership rejected Woodside's preference for a floating offshore plant, and the 
government doggedly pursued its ambition to have the plant built on the south coast 
of Timar. Prime Minister Gusmao declared he would rather see Timor-Leste go 
without the benefits of this project than to accept the offshore plant proposal. 
Though the location of the plant was a commercial decision by Woodside, Timor-
Leste' s stance could result in the lapse of its contract by February 2013, meaning 
Timor-Leste would need to find a new development partner more agreeable to its 
plans. There were some preliminary signs, however, that the parties to this $20-
billion discussion would find a mutually constructive way forward, with Woodside 
offering the possibility of establishing a smaller onshore processing center at Beaco, 
on the sou th coast. 
In early 2011, the UNDP came under sustained attack from the Timorese 
government for its draft report, which was critical of the government's performance 
on urban youth unemployment, rising rural poverty, and expenditures of oil and gas 
revenues. 28 Highlighting the ongoing challenges of energy supply, food security, and 
education and health-service provision, the report raised the ire of the Timorese 
government by also questioning its opposition to war crimes and its efforts to 
prosecute those guilty of past violence. The government considered these issues 
beyond the UNDPs brief. A short-lived furor highlighted the impatience of domestic 
political elites for the end of the long decade of state-building, after several missions. 
The UNMIT mission and its associated international policing forces were scheduled 
to be withdrawn by the end of December 2012. The stated position of the ISF was 
that it would also withdraw at that time if the situation proved stable, leaving 
Australia's separate Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) with the Timor-Leste 
Defence Force in place. 
The 2012 Elections 
In 2012, President Jose Ramos-Horta was voted out of office, to be replaced by 
the then-recently retired head of the armed forces, Taur Matan Ruak. Without the 
support of a major party, Horta received 18 percent in the election's first round in 
28 See, for example, Lindsay Murdoch, "East Timor Leaders Scathing about Crucial UN 
Report," Sydney Morning Herald, January 3, 2011, http:/ /www.smh.corn.au/world/east-timor-
leaders-scathing-about-crucial-un-report-20110102-19d22.html, accessed August 7, 2012. · 
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March, finishing behind Ruak and Fretilin' s Lu Olo. Running as an independent, but 
with the open support of CNRT, Ruak defeated Lu Olo in the second-round runoff in 
April, by an overwhelming margin of 61 percent to 39 percent. The one feature that 
Ramos-Horta and Ruak had in common was, at the time of their political 
ascendancy, they were both strongly supported by Xanana Gusmao. 
The parliamentary elections held on July 7 saw just four of the twenty-one 
parties competing win seats. Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao' s CNRT performed 
strongly and finished in first position, with 36.66 percent of the national vote, 
followed by FRETILIN, with just under 30 percent. With the collapse of the former 
ASDT-PSD vote, the Democratic Party (PD) emerged clearly as the new third party, 
with 10.3 percent of the vote, and Frenti-Mudanc_;:a, a small breakaway party from 
FRETILIN, received 3.11 percent. These parliamentary election results gave CNRT 
thirty seats; Fretilin, twenty-five; PD, eight; and Frenti-Mudanc;a, two seats in the 
new parliament. 
As in 2007, no single party gained an absolute majority of thirty-three seats in its 
own right. However, a large number of small parties failed to clear the 3 percent 
threshold in 2012. This meant that 20 percent of the national vote-the total received 
by eliminated parties-was excluded for the purpose of seat distribution. As such, 
CNRT's 37 percent vote share brought them closer to 45 percent of the seats, putting 
them in a strong position to lead a new alliance. A week after results were known, 
the CNRT party conference announced its intention to form a governing alliance 
with PD and Frenti-Mudarn;;a, suggesting continuity with the 2007 result, albeit with 
a smaller number of parties in alliance. This alliance, later to be known as the Bloku 
Governu Koligasaun (BGK, Government Coalition Bloc) would control forty seats in 
the sixty-five seat parliament. The CNRT's decision, which was televised live,29 saw a 
brief outbreak of violence by disgruntled FRETILIN party members in Dili, with 
some sixty-five cars reportedly burned or otherwise destroyed, and, more seriously, 
eight people wounded, including at least four police officers. Other incidents, 
including arson, were reported in Lautem and Viqueque. In the most serious 
incident, a young FRETILIN member was killed by police in Hera, just outside Dili. 
Though the latter episode raised ongoing questions over police violence, the post-
election environment calmed considerably within days. More broadly, international 
observers declared that the elections substantially met the international criteria for 
being free and fair, which was a notable achievement for Timor-Leste's two electoral 
bodies, running national elections without major external support for the first time. 
Notwithstanding these positives, which marked Timor-Leste as a frontrunner in a 
region noted for poor electoral administration, there were a number of minor, mostly 
technical problems with the election process, including inconsistency of ink for 
marking fingers in the first presidential round, concerns over the print quality of 
some parliamentary ballot papers, and rare occasions of party agent interference in 
the administration of the vote. Some observer reports also called for greater scrutiny 
of corporate donations to CNRT' s electoral campaign, and for clearer guidelines and 
sanctions relating to political party and campaign financing. 
CNRT finished first in all but four districts: the three eastern districts where 
FRETILIN once again dominated the poll, and the neighboring western district of 
Manufahi, where FRETILIN narrowly led the count. In general, CNRT's success 
29 FRETILIN leaders attributed the viole.nce to what they claimed were provocative comments 
broadcast from the CNRT conference that day. 
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came overwhelmingly at the expense of small, western-based parties such as ASDT, 
PSD, and PUN, which received no seats. Overall, while the association between 
region and party affiliation remained noticeable in 2012, it had moderated since 2007, 
with FRETILIN' s vote staging a minor recovery (3.7 percent) in the western districts, 
and CNRT and PD increasing their vote shares in the eastern districts, such that the 
FRETILIN vote declined 5.6 percent in its heartland. This trend, already evident in 
the presidential elections, represented a welcome-if modest-sign that regionalized 
vote affiliations were trending away from their 2007 peak. 
TIMOR-LESTE'S POLITICAL SYSTEM 
Timor-Leste is a unitary democratic republic with multitiered governance. The 
constitution is closely based on the Portuguese model, with a directly elected 
president as head of state, a parliament having all legislative authority, and a prime 
minister as head of the executive government and cabinet. Parliamentary 
representatives are elected under a party-list proportional representation system to 
serve five-year terms. 
More broadly, it is important to appreciate the procedural separation of 
executive and legislature in the East Timorese political system. A minister does not 
need to be a member of parliament (MP), although most are, and any MP 
subsequently appointed to the executive government is replaced in the legislature 
per party lists.30 Thus, while the prime minister requires the confidence of the 
parliament, and the executive frequently attends sittings in the legislature (and 
parliamentary committee meetings in order to be questioned), the executive does not 
have a legislative vote, as in a Westminster parliamentary system. This feature is 
made possible by Timor-Leste's party-list proportional representation electoral 
system. When a member is appointed to the executive government, a member of the 
same political party from the original list replaces that member in the legislature. 
This shift may also happen "in reverse," as evidenced by Mario Carrascalao's return 
to the legislature as a PSD member of parliament after his resignation as deputy 
prime minister in September 2010. 
Under changes to the electoral law passed in December 2006, the thirteen 
district-representative positions were abolished and the size of the National 
Parliament decreased overall from eighty-eight members to sixty-five.31 Each party 
was required to submit a list of sixty-five candidates and twenty-five suplentes 
(reserves).32 Under the changes to the electoral system, parties or coalitions must 
reach a 3 percent threshold to be eligible for seats. This new hurdle requirement 
would rule out half the parties running in 2007, and all but four parties in 2012. 
Parliamentary seats are then distributed proportionally among qualifying parties-
based on a single national constituency-to ensure "broad representation in the 
parliamentary composition." 33 
The constitution also mandates that the government enact legislation to achieve 
greater decentralization, to establish a full judicial system and other matters of 
conventional state function. As of mid-2012, Timor-Leste did not yet have a supreme 
30 Government of Timor-Leste, Law on the Election of the National Parliament, Law No. 
6/2006, 28 December, Article 15.5. 
31 Ibid., Article 10. 
32 Ibid., Article 12.1. 
33 Ibid., Preamble. 
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court, so constitutional questions were in theory being addressed by the appeals 
court. The judiciary is generally regarded as a weak state institution, plagued by 
inadequate training, staffing problems, and judicial shortages, all complicated by a 
language policy which-unlike parliamentary deliberation-requires processes to be 
conducted in Portuguese, making the court system heavily reliant on cumbersome 
translation processes and, frequently, resulting in the effective disenfranchisement of 
citizens involved with the courts. The National Parliament is expected to pass 
legislation to progressively replace laws that were inherited from Indonesia and then 
adopted as interim law by UNTAET. The backlog of legislation before the National 
Parliament is, in part, a result of parliament or its committees regularly failing to 
achieve a quorum, and is also due to the lack of adequate research and staffing 
support for MPs. Issues of translation of legislation from the official Portuguese into 
languages better understood by many parliamentarians (usually Tetum) have also 
slowed the legislative process. 
Decree laws passed by the executive (sitting as the Council of Ministers) are 
issued in a wide range of standard regulatory areas and in some key policy areas, 
including the penal code and the establishment of the National Petroleum 
Authority.34 This has the effect of limiting public debate over key legislation and 
limiting parliamentary scrutiny of the executive government. More broadly, 
government capacity is limited, falling away quickly beyond the ministerial and 
bureaucratic-director levels, and constrained by the central government's limited 
reach outside the major towns. Decision making is slow, and efficiency often 
depends on personal relationships. A decision by the prime minister or another 
senior minister will ensure quick action, often across departments. Implementing 
state policy through conventional bureaucratic processes is frustratingly slow and 
often unsuccessful. 
Elected district councils are intended to replace national-government-appointed 
district administrators by 2014, although some parts of the enabling legislation had 
not been passed at the time of writing. Certain local councils and authorities have 
already been established and are functioning. There are the locally elected, nominally 
non-party hamlet and village chiefs (chefe de aldeia, chefe de suco) and elected suco 
councils. Suco elections have been held twice since independence, and party political 
competition at that level has been formally proscribed since 2009. Decentralized 
funding is intended to be allocated by the central government on a pro rata basis. 
This plan to implement limited decentralization and establish district assemblies 
recognizes Timor-Leste's diverse ethnic makeup and largely rural demography. 
High turnout rates in the 2009 suco elections again reflected the strong popular 
commitment to participating in the electoral process. 
National elections have been held every five years since 2001. It is too early in the 
life of independent Timor-Leste to determine whether elections will be held more 
frequently in the future, although representatives are legally required to serve a 
maximum of five years per term. Voting is voluntary. Considering that voter rolls are 
not being adequately updated to take into account deaths, double registrations (a 
result of re-registrations that do not imply double voting), and the presence of 
nonresident East Timorese on the voter roll, the participation rate of just under 82 
34 Dennis Shoesmith, "Remaking the State in Timor-Leste: The Case for Constitutional 
Reform," Proceedings of the 17th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia 
(2008), pp. 1-19. 
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percent in the 2007 elections, as officially reported, was likely closer to 90 percent. 
Despite a slight downturn in 2012 to 75 percent (with a similar level of under-
reporting likely), enthusiasm for voting remains very high across the country. 
THE CHAPTERS 
Among the problems facing post-colonial states is that of establishing a durable 
balance between the national government and the various centrifugal forces that 
might threaten state sovereignty. The relative strengths of national and local loyalties 
represent a key polarity of this balance, which may impede long-term aspirations for 
national integration. Long-time observer of Timorese cultural life David Hicks 
examines this issue through his study of rural Timorese communities, whose 
members frequently identify more strongly as residents of those local communities 
than as citizens of the state. Hicks's central argument is that the failure to transform 
villagers into citizens indicates the existence of two political cultures of such 
disparate character that they militate against the ambitions of Timor-Leste's 
government to foster an integrated national identity. His chapter argues that a 
synthesis is necessary if the mass of the Timorese population is to be transformed 
from villagers into citizens. Hicks concludes by arguing that although each political 
culture possesses distinctive traits that might at first sight appear irreconcilable, it is 
yet possible to synthesize an integrated national political culture that draws on the 
strengths of both sources of political identity. 
Because Timor-Leste has a directly elected president and a prime minister 
accountable to the parliament, the political system is commonly described as a semi-
presidential system. However, Maurice Duverger's classic definition of a semi-
presidential system also requires that that president possess "quite considerable 
powers." 35 The relative weakness of presidential powers in Timor-Leste's system of 
government-compared with the governments of some other Lusophone states-has 
led other commentators to describe this system as a parliamentary republic, lacking 
the substantive division of executive power that typifies semi-presidential political 
systems. This debate over the character of Timor-Leste's government is examined in 
close detail in this collection, with contributions from Rui Feijo and Damien 
Kingsbury, respectively, outlining the claims in favor of interpreting the Timor-Leste 
political system as semi-presidential or as parliamentary republican. 
Rui Feijo argues for classifying the system as semi-presidential, seeing Timor-
Leste as an example of the 11premier-presidential" sub-type. He argues that the East 
Timorese president retains significant powers that mark the office as more than 
symbolic, including certain constitutional powers yet to be facilitated by legislation. 
Feijo makes the case that semi-presidentialism has also allowed the creation of a 
"common house" for competing poles of power and remains preferable, in the East 
Timorese context, to the alternatives of a presidential or parliamentary political 
system. 
By contrast, Damien Kingsbury proposes that Tirnor-Leste's constitution defines 
its political system as a parliamentary republic, taking into account the limited 
powers of the Presidency, the exclusive responsibility of executive government to the 
legislature, and, above all, the undivided capacity of the Prime Minister to appoint 
35 Maurice Duverger, "A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government," 
European Journal of Political Research 8 (1980): 166. 
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the executive government. Since Timor-Leste's Head of State lacks executive 
authority in all but a small and circumscribed area of affairs of state, Kingsbury 
argues that overstating presidential powers can potentially undermine the stability 
of the state. 
One of the major challenges facing Timor-Leste is that of corruption, which 
Aderito Soares tackles in his chapter. Although there have been few major 
prosecutions for grand-scale corruption to date, Soares notes that the public has been 
highly critical of a perceived rise in corruption in the period following independence. 
Soares contends that these public perceptions are justified, and that forms of 
corruption exist at various levels of government and in the public sphere. There is, 
therefore, general agreement that it is timely to address the issue of corruption with a 
comprehensive anticorruption strategy, including the establishment of Timar' s Anti-
Corruption Commission (CAC), of which he is head. Soares's chapter goes on to 
examine some constraints and opportunities in tackling corruption in Timor-Leste. 
The chapter highlights the rationale behind the fight against corruption, and also 
identifies the different entities that play a role in the area. Soares's key argument is a 
warning against forms of "institutional ritualism" in the fight against corruption, 
which he sees as the inclination of governments to "form new agencies rather than 
address the actual problems." 
Andrew Marriott's chapter develops a parallel analysis to that of David Hicks, 
but from a legal rather than an anthropological perspective. Marriott argues that as a 
still-young state, Timor-Leste has not yet been able to put its turbulent history fully 
behind it. While the state and its citizens require new institutions and social 
dynamics, historical crimes remain as much a concern as contemporary injustices. 
Though the democratic architecture of the East Timorese state guarantees some 
commendable protections, he says, the ability of formal institutions to respond 
directly to the range of everyday legal needs remains limited. Some of these 
shortcomings are simply a reflection of Timor-Leste's emergence from a period of 
violence and turmoil. Other shortcomings, according to Marriott, represent 
developmental oversights or missteps, which he suggests require attention and 
correction. As comparisons between various post-colonial countries demonstrate, 
actors in the legal sphere can play an important role in the nation-building endeavor. 
In Timor-Leste, as elsewhere, a competitive multiparty system remains a 
fundamental cornerstone of democratic consolidation. In his contribution, Dennis 
Shoesmith examines political parties in Timor-Leste, analyzing the strengths and 
weaknesses of the party system and the degree of institutionalization of 
contemporary political parties. Commencing with an examination of the historical 
development of the party system in Timor-Leste, Shoesmith assesses the 
contemporary health of the party system, reviewing its basis in constitutional and 
electoral law, and some key constraints on the role of parties in the context of 
Timor's political system. Shoesmith argues that Timor-Leste has performed 
creditably compared with many post-conflict states, exhibiting a degree of political 
stability in interparty competition. Nonetheless, his chapter identifies warning signs 
that some persistent maladies characteristic of weak party systems are emerging, 
including patron-client politics, low levels of accountability to the public, and the use 
of political parties as vehicles to extract state resources for the benefit of political 
elites. 
In his chapter, Pedro Seabra argues that Timor-Leste has become increasingly 
vocal and assertive on a range of foreign policy topics since overcoming some of the 
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internal strife that scarred the nation-building process from 2006 to 2008. For Seabra, 
this assertiveness indicates the new nation's political will to enhance or diversify its 
role in the region. The potential ripple effects across the region-given the level of 
international focus on Timor-Leste, the country's strategic geographic location, and 
its significant natural wealth-are as yet unpredictable. Accordingly, Seabra starts by 
examining the current context of Timor-Leste' s foreign policy, identifying the main 
external partners and foreign policy goals it has established since joining the 
international community, with a detailed focus on relationships with four key actors: 
Australia, China, Indonesia, and Portugal. Seabra then examines some instructive 
episodes in Timor's foreign-policy development that have raised concerns among its 
traditional partners, who are now confronted with an increasingly assertive and 
independent actor. 
Deborah Cummins' s and Michael Leach's chapter returns to the theme of the 
evolving relationship between traditional and modern forms of political authority, 
examining the case of local government in Timor-Leste, and the ways elected chefes 
interact with traditional authorities at the suco level. Cummins and Leach identify 
three distinct models of hybrid authority in local government: two "co-incumbency" 
models and an "authorization" model, emphasizing a separation of powers between 
traditional and modern authority. As Cummins and Leach note, the "clash of 
paradigms" between traditional and modern democratic ideas of legitimacy in 
Timor-Leste is widely considered to be an important issue for the stability of the 
young state. The balance of this relationship is likewise considered integral to 
engaging local communities in the project of nation-building, peace-building, and 
democratization. There are also critical and ongoing issues for government to 
consider in the continuing decentralization process, and in regulating aspects of 
customary law, particularly at the local level. 
Bu Wilson's chapter evaluates the security-sector reform agenda in Timor-Leste 
during the period between 2006 and 2012, including the specific process of reforming 
the national police. The political and security crisis of 2006, with its origins rooted in 
conflicts within and between the uniformed forces, highlighted the necessity of 
reforming Timor-Leste' s police and military, and their respective oversight 
ministries. Yet, as Wilson notes, the reform project, which was premised on 
cooperation between international and national actors, has stumbled, faltered, and 
perhaps even failed in key respects. Wilson examines how an ill-defined project, 
contests over sovereignty, shortcomings in capacity, and incompatible international 
and national agendas have worked to produce poor long-term prospects for the 
security sector in Timor-Leste. 
In his chapter on informal security groups, James Scambary builds upon this 
theme, examining the origin and impacts of martial arts and ex-veterans' groups in 
the post-independence political landscape. Charting the historical progression of 
these groups as they evolved from resistance movements to protest vehicles, and 
their interactions with formal political actors, Scambary highlights the ongoing 
strength of these groups beyond the intense conflicts of 2006--07. Scambary argues 
that the combination of a poorly functioning justice system with an inefficient 
policing force continues to encourage a default situation in which communities look 
to informal security groups for protection, as evidenced by further outbreaks of 
urban violence in Dili between 2009 and 2012. 
Since independence1 economic development has remained a major challenge for 
national policy makers and, at times, a keystone of popular dissatisfaction. Tim 
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Anderson's chapter identifies key contemporary approaches to development strategy 
and assesses their application in the case of Timor-Leste since independence. He 
contrasts the influence of market-economy approaches with those of developmental-
state models and an alternative "human development" approach, which focuses on 
developing core capabilities in areas such as education, health1 gender equality, and 
participation. Anderson reviews the history of development strategy in Timor Leste' s 
National Development Plan and analyzes the approaches of the two major post-
independence governments in relation to key issues of economic stimulus, 
infrastructure development, tax policy, and petroleum revenues. In particular, 
Anderson analyzes recent debates over the management and expenditure of the 
Petroleum Fund, arguing that while diversification from low-return US bonds may 
be prudent, Timor-Leste currently lacks the financial expertise required to manage 
the funds in more volatile, higher-risk financial and equity markets. Overall, 
Anderson makes the case that the critical importance of the informal sector, and 
particularly staple-food production1 has not been matched by comparable state 
investment. 
Sara Niner examines the critical theme of the contemporary politics of gender in 
Timor-Leste. Arguing from the starting point that traditional concepts of gender 
remain extremely influential in the country, Niner examines the ways these 
conceptions have been reinforced or modified by the legacies of Portuguese and 
Indonesian colonialism. She also examines the influence of militarized conceptions of 
masculine identity that emerged in the resistance era, which were echoed by recent 
popular figures such as the rebel military leader Alfredo Reinado. Noting the 
especially poor development outcomes for women in Timor-Leste, along with 
disturbing levels of domestic violence and the little acknowledged, but centralr role 
of women in the resistance, Niner makes the case that gender relations remain a key 
priority in Timor-Leste's development, calling for a "national dialogue on 
masculinities and the legacy of the war." 
In his second contribution, Damien Kingsbury examines the evolving politics of 
political and financial decentralization in Timor-Leste. Using the wider regional 
history of centralization in post-colonial developing states as context, Kingsbury 
assesses the potential strengths and weaknesses of this agenda for both development 
and democratic consolidation in Timor-Leste. Principally concerned with creating 
greater responsiveness between the state and its citizens by devolving a degree of 
political and economic authority to the district level, decentralization will also allow 
for greater recognition of the diversity of Timor-Leste's society. As Kingsbury notes, 
the process of decentralization in Timor-Leste began in 2003, but with progress on a 
final model delayed at least until 2014, this agenda remains a work in progress. 
BEYOND UNMIT: CHALLENGES TO POLITICAL STABILITY 
As a recently decolonized state, Timor-Leste has faced the fundamental 
challenge that frequently besets developing-post-independence states: seeking to 
balance popular aspirations against limited state capacity. Having stumbled in 2006, 
Timor-Leste now appears to be charting a steadier course. In the short period since 
its independence referendum of 1999, Timor-Leste now stands as a state that 
embodies many of the important contemporary challenges of post-colonial 
democratization, development, and foternational state-building. More than any other 
country, Timor-Leste has been the product of international support. There is little 
20 Michael Leach and Damien Kingsbury 
doubt, for example, that Timor-Leste's political institutions reflect, with degrees of 
embeddedness, the liberal character of the international community in general, and 
the United Nations in particular. 
The withdrawal of UN peacekeeping forces from Timor-Leste in 2005 soon 
proved to have been precipitous, necessitating an unplanned and hasty return of 
international peacekeepers in 2006. Both domestic and international state-builders 
will have this experience in mind as external forces withdraw in late 2012, along with 
the knowledge that the Security Council is unlikely to approve another support 
mission at the scale of UNMISET or UNMIT. The period of transitioning toward full 
responsibility therefore places the focus squarely on Timor-Leste's ability to run its 
own affairs without succumbing to the type of internal conflict witnessed in 2006-7. 
Considering the turmoil of the crisis, the period since 2008 has been characterized by 
a remarkable degree of stability and real, if modest, improvements in Timor-Leste' s 
human development indicators. This has facilitated the staged transition to local 
policing, completed in early 2011, and the accompanying drawdown of international 
forces, to the point in 2012 at which the UNPOL contingent had declined from 1,600 
to 1,300 and ISF numbers represented less than half their 2006 peak force of 1,100 
soldiers. 
Several major tests will confront the East Timorese state beyond the UN 
withdrawal. The most important of these will be the challenge of stimulating 
economic growth, a task constrained by the passing of the state-developmental era 
and the rise of neoliberal free-market approaches to state-building.36 As Barbara 
notes, the era of neoliberal state-building has been characterized by an aversion to 
promoting specific industry policies. Constrained in this manner, neoliberal efforts 
have generally proven ineffectual in stimulating economic development in post-
conflict states, thus undermining prospects for state consolidation.37 In his review of 
state-building missions of the 1990s and 2000s, Fukuyama identifies three distinct 
phases, suggesting that while the United Nations has a respectable track record in 
the initial stabilization of post-conflict societies, and in the development of local 
institutions for governance, it has a far weaker track record in strengthening those 
institutions to the point that enables sustained economic growth and social 
development to occur.38 
Central to this challenge will be the task of effectively managing Timor-Leste's 
oil and gas reserves. There has been considerable debate about the wisdom of 
accessing increased shares of Petroleum Fund capital to more rapidly develop local 
projects. On one hand, the injection of cash-accelerated projects has increased their 
number and reach, which has had positive social benefits. A number of observers, 
however, have expressed concern that this influx of revenue may lead to a "resource 
curse," whereby funds are squandered, corruption increases, and the funds are 
ultimately depleted without the development of alternative industries. In 
conjunction with a weak party system, the proliferation of oil and gas revenues also 
has the potential to foster the growth of patron-client politics, and the type of 
intergroup contests over control of state resources likely to exacerbate the risks 
36 Mark T. Berger and Heloise Weber, "Beyond State-Building: Global Governance and the 
Crisis of the Nation-State System in the 21st Century," Third World Quarterly 27,l (2006): 201. 
37 Barbara, "Rethinking Neo-Liberal State Building," p. 316. 
38 See Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 99-104. · 
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associated with regionalized political affiliations. In particular, local NGOs warned 
that if government spending was not made more sustainable, Timor-Leste' s current 
oil wealth could be depleted within ten years, just as a massive demographic 
explosion of young adults is due to enter the labor market.39 
Another challenge likely to confront Timor-Leste will be the transition to a new 
generation of political leaders. Much of the bitter conflict within Timor-Leste's small 
political elite was intimately linked with longstanding personal alliances and feuds 
among the senior leadership of the country. While the series of "historical leaders" 
meetings40 held by members of this group have been a welcome development for 
political stability, a transition to a younger generation is inevitable and perhaps 
overdue. Aside from PD, the major political parties are still led by the older 
generation, though there is now more open discussion among members of the 
"generation of '75" about the inevitability of a hand-over of power, probably in the 
wake of the 2012 elections, with FRETILIN' s 2011 congress formalizing a decision to 
transition to a younger generation of political leaders in 2017. Along with high youth 
unemployment, the "disconnect" between the political elite and younger East 
Timorese remained a background factor in latent political tensions and gang 
violence. A youth parliament launched in January 2010 and the greater (though still 
inadequate) recognition of the contribution youth resistance leaders made during the 
Indonesian occupation are welcome signs of a renewed political engagement with 
younger East Timorese. The fact that the former chief of the armed forces, Taur 
Matan Ruak, was elected president in 2012 signaled a transition beyond the oldest 
members of the generation of '75, though a transition to those raised in the 
Indonesian era would wait until at least 2017. 
A significant challenge, as noted above, lies in ongoing concerns over justice and 
the rule of law in Timor-Leste and, in particular, in reconciling popular desires for 
post-conflict justice with the government's political support for a reconciliation 
agenda. There are grave concerns that a culture of impunity for past crimes in Timor-
Leste continues to undermine social harmony. Indicative of these concerns, in late 
2009, the parliament finally discussed the Commission for Reception, Truth, and 
Reconciliation (Comissao de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliac;ao de Timor Leste, 
CAVR) report on deaths and human-rights abuses between 1974 and 1999, a full four 
years after formally receiving the final report in November 2005. Throughout 2010 
and 2011, the parliament repeatedly delayed consideration of two proposed laws on 
victim reparations and the establishment of a National Institute of Memory, designed 
to 11 promote, facilitate, and monitor the implementation of the Recommendations" 
made by the CA VR and the bilateral Indonesia-Timar-Leste Truth and Friendship 
Commission. No progress had been made on related legislation as of mid-2012. In 
light of wider concerns over Timor-Leste's poorly functioning judicial system, in 
many, and perhaps most cases, local people in the districts had reverted to 
traditional justice systems, which allowed for greater accessibility, speed, and local 
acceptance in resolving local disputes. However, there were also concerns over the 
use of traditional justice, which remains vulnerable to abuses of power, often 
39 La'o Hamutuk, "Timor-Leste Is Going for Broke," March 19, 2012, http:/ I 
laohamutuk.blogspot.com.au I 2012 I 03 I timor-leste-is-going-for-broke.html, accessed August 
14, 2012. 
40 11Breaking News: Timorese Historical. Leaders Hold Closed Meeting in Maubisse," Tempo 
Semanal, August, 22, 2010, http: I I temposemanaltimor.blogspot.com.au/2010 I 08 /breaking-
news-timorese-historical.html, accessed August 7, 2012. 
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reinforces traditional hierarchies, may be subject to inconsistent application, and 
threatens to reduce state legitimacy. How Timor-Leste reconciles the benefits and 
strengths of tradition with the requirements of a modern liberal citizenship-based 
polity will remain a key focus in the areas of local government and dispute 
resolution. 
The multifaceted issues involved in democratic consolidation will also remain a 
key focus beyond the international state-building era. Timor-Leste fulfills many of 
the conventional criteria for fulfilling democracy's procedural requirements, such as 
free and fair regular elections, free association (including forming political parties 
and the right to protest), a relatively free media, and a moderately active civil society. 
Key state institutions, including the judiciary, police and defense forces, and other 
government departments, have all been set in place. The relatively peaceful conduct 
of the three polls in 2007 and 2012 and the degree of institutional capacity 
demonstrated by the National Electoral Commission (CNE), along with the goodwill 
of the international community, augured well for the future of East Timorese 
democracy. 
However, the extent to which Timor-Leste conformed to substantive 
interpretations of democracy was debatable. While representatives were freely 
elected, the process for selecting candidates was relatively closed, and political 
leaders frequently appealed to voters on the basis of primordial loyalties rather than 
policy preferences. State institutions existed, but the notion of the separation of 
powers, for example, was compromised by occasional executive interference in 
judicial processes, a practical (as opposed to constitutional) confusion of roles 
between the president and the prime minister, the army's adoption of civil policing 
functions, an inadequate and poorly performing judiciary, a police force still known 
for its corruption and brutality, and low levels of institutional performance in the 
public service. 
This state of affairs was perhaps not surprising, given the very low level of state 
development and capacity at the outset, and the observation that democratic 
institutions tend to function best, particularly in multiethnic societies, where 
accountability and rule of law are already established.41 As such, while most of the 
procedural criteria for democratic process could be identified, as indeed they had 
been by the international community, each of these criteria required an often serious 
qualification, which, in the period leading up to the peacekeepers' withdrawal, much 
of the international community seemed willing to gloss over. 
The party system1 and its ongoing development and maturation, will also pose 
challenges. With the clear exception of FRETILIN, and the possible exception of 
CNRT, political parties in Timor-Leste are overly reliant on key personalities; many 
lack wide-ranging policy platforms, sufficient depth in their districts' organizations, 
coherent internal rules, and organizational discipline. In 2006, the return of 
"resistance era" tactics of political opposition, including the systematic use of 
unemployed youth and martial arts gangs as a political resource for warring factions 
of the elite, signaled a clear warning sign for the future of East Timorese democracy. 
With the assistance of the international community, and the wise restraint shown by 
senior East Timorese leaders, the 2007 national elections in Timor-Leste marked a 
turning point, with the emergence of a genuinely competitive multiparty system in 
41 P. Collier. Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places (New York, NY: Harp~r­
Collins, 2009), pp. 173-76, 186. 
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Timor-Leste and, importantly, a viable and substantial parliamentary opposition 
party. Across the term of the 2007-12 parliament, the AMP government could be 
credited with resolving many of the entrenched grievances that had beset Timorese 
politics after the 2006 crisis. Conversely, FRETILIN received too little credit for its 
key role in fostering a culture of democratic parliamentary opposition in that 
period-even if its continuing rhetoric about "de facto" governments had been less 
than helpful in this regard. Rather than the heavily monitored 2012 election period 
itself, the months following the polls, and the subsequent withdrawal of state-
building forces, would prove the most rigorous test of this newfound political 
stability, and Timor-Leste's capacity to function as a fully independent and sovereign 
state. The brief but disturbing outburst of violence that followed the announcement 
of a new governing coalition in July 2012 highlighted these concerns. 
In the years leading up to the 2012 elections, East Timorese political leaders 
expressed increasingly pointed observations that Timor-Leste was a sovereign state 
that no longer needed or desired a high level of external involvement in its affairs. 
Public attacks on the UNDP, for example, reflected growing impatience within 
government circles for the departure of international state-building forces. But while 
the decade-long international presence generated some discontent in 2011 and 2012, 
Timor-Leste's experience as an emerging state was, in fact, far from unique in the 
context of the region, with the Solomon Islands approaching the ten-year 
anniversary of the regional state-building mission, RAMSI (Regional Assistance 
Mission to the Solomon Islands). In different contexts, the emerging states of New 
Caledonia and Bougainville were both in negotiated long-term transitions to 
potential independence, involving the progressive transfer of government powers, 
and referenda on full independence expected between 2014 and 2020. The southwest 
Pacific region was, in many respects, a hothouse of new experiments in international 
state-building, staged decolonization, regional autonomy, and transitions to full 
independence. Frequently judged in comparison with well-established Southeast 
Asian states and found wanting, Timor-Leste's performance, relative to more 
suitable comparisons with emerging Melanesian states, was favorable. Buttressed by 
its oil and gas revenues, and with a formidable history of determined struggle for 
independence, Timor-Leste has grounds for cautious optimism about its future. 
